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Abstract 
 
As a former journalist, Australian Prime Minister John Curtin developed relatively new 
media techniques to persuade reporters to support his war leadership and articulate his 
rhetoric of crisis, masking the tensions within his governance. Yet there are gaps in the 
historical understanding of his news management techniques in World War II and their 
influence on prime ministerial-media relations and political journalism of the era. This paper 
contributes to a deeper understanding of the relationships of influence and consensus between 
Curtin and the news media, based on concepts of the governmental function of news in an 
administered society, developed by Ericson, Baranek and Chan, as well as Foucault’s model 
of power. With the use of rarely researched confidential communications providing fresh 
insights into Curtin’s news relations, this paper argues that press and broadcast journalists 
cooperated with him to visualise national deviance, in the form of Axis foes, and accentuate 
his language of the enemy to elicit public support for his governance. Through a dramaturgy 
approach, this study shows that Curtin stage-managed and expanded the prime minister’s 
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news interviews to appear as spontaneous, open-ended and inclusive; however, he relied on 
theatrical gesturing, camera techniques and rehearsed rhetoric to generate favourable news 
coverage about his leadership of Australia’s military role in the Pacific war from 1941 until 
his death in 1945. Although he benefited from censorship, he used his professional 
journalism background and the nation’s first full-time prime ministerial press secretary to 
share information leaks selectively with journalists. The political correspondents volunteered 
to withhold information and cooperated to portray him as a forceful, egalitarian leader, 
disguising the friction among the Allies. This study of Curtin’s news management techniques 
and interactions with reporters indicates the democratic possibilities for journalism students 
of using expanded communication spaces for more critical inquiry to generate greater 
political responsiveness and accountability to public audiences. 
 
Introduction 
As a former journalist, Australian Prime Minister John Curtin expanded news 
management techniques by giving more frequent, off-the-record interviews, radio talks and 
newsreel conferences to generate reporters’ positive coverage about his leadership. Curtin 
extended his prime ministerial predecessors’ techniques that had relied on more formal press 
announcements and the sporadic development of emerging broadcast news to influence 
public audiences. Using his professional background as a labour-oriented editor and 
journalism unionist, he framed news reports about his national leadership from 7 October 
1941 to 5 July 1945 during World War II (hereafter the war) (Alexander, 1971; National Film 
and Sound Archive, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c; Rodgers, 1971). By the time that he became the 
prime minister, the conflict scenes had already created mass media audiences and initiated 
eye-witness reporting techniques of battle zones (Brennan, 1994; Nicholas, 2005; Petersen, 
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1993; Tunstall, 1971). Through a rare analysis of his newsreel offcuts, broadcast talks and 
secretive interviews, this paper shows his ability to stage scenes to appear as a strong, 
democratic leader and visualise Axis threats to Australia to secure the correspondents’ 
endorsement of his governance (Alexander, 1971; British Movietone News, 1942, 1944a, 
1944b, 1944c; Cinesound Productions, 1941; Curtin, 1941a, 1942a, 1943a, 1944a; Rodgers, 
1971; ScreenSound Australia, 1944). 
This paper’s analytical approach is based on the insights that wartime journalism was 
a critical part of social governance; that news was a governmental function within a 
democratic society, following from the ideas of Richard V. Ericson, Patricia M. Baranek and 
Janet B. L. Chan (1987) and Michel Foucault (1975, 1980, 1988, 1991). Wartime journalistic 
practice was a central agency in the governance of a “knowledge”, “administered” or 
“information” society. Ericson, Baranek and Chan (1987, pp. 1, 16) characterise journalists as 
working with political leaders and “playing a key role in constituting visions of order, 
stability and change”. Thus news reporters were the government’s “information brokers” and 
“knowledge linkers”, who were engaged in reproducing the messages of their sources for 
news audiences (p. 16). Likewise, Foucault’s model of power connects with the Ericson et al 
model of news in an administered society. According to Foucault (1980, 1988, 1991), 
successful government leaders in western liberal democracies have used relatively modern 
technologies, including the media, to enable the management of the nation. These concepts 
are useful to analyse the close relations between Curtin and the Canberra Parliamentary Press 
Gallery.  
To develop successful government-media relations, democratic leaders should be 
familiar with news making processes and “the mundane milieu” in which journalists create 
and circulate news stories and commentaries. These work practices include the “routine 
relationship” between journalists and their sources, governmental authorities that are mainly 
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“expert, bureaucratic and political”, as well as the use of the latest media technology 
(Ericson, Baranek & Chan, 1987; Foucault, 1991; Mickler, 1996, p. 20). Following from this 
framework, Curtin’s familiarity with news making procedures helped him to create 
Australia’s first prime ministerial press secretary role and develop relatively new media talks 
to persuade journalists to reproduce his visions of order, stability and change. While he 
benefited from censorship, he developed tactics to create the sense of informal, friendly press 
relations and journalists voluntarily withheld contentious war information (Alexander, 
Papers, 1941-1945; Burgoyne, 1942; Curtin, 1942b; Rodgers, 1971). His private, two-way 
news conferences differed from the more structured press interactions of his predecessors as 
well as those of other Allied wartime leaders including British Prime Minister Winston 
Churchill, Canadian leader W. L. M. King and US President Franklin D. Roosevelt (Coatney, 
2009; Lloyd, 1988). Furthermore, he used more direct radio talks and close-up, eye-level 
newsreel scenes, tempering his appeals to democratic ideals with enemy warnings to elicit 
audiences’ support of his leadership (Cinesound Productions, 1941; Cinesound Review, 
1943; Curtin, 1942a, 1944a; National Film and Sound Archive, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c; 
ScreenSound Australia, 1944; Ward, 1999). These insights into journalism as a critical 
process of governance help students to understand how war correspondents joined with 
Curtin to define “deviance”, predominantly Axis enemies, and to articulate society’s “proper 
bounds of behaviour” by cooperating with him (Ericson, Baranek & Chan, 1987, 1). As he 
declared in a Cinesound newsreel released shortly after Australia’s 1941 entry in the Pacific 
war, all citizens should help “keep the workshops active” to support “our gallant fighting 
forces” (Cinesound Productions, 1941). This framework also shows the value for journalism 
students to understand government forms of persuasion at times of crisis and develop more 
independent, investigative reporting techniques. 
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To assess Curtin’s news management techniques, this paper examines under-
researched, top-secret war communications to identify his use of news conferences, off-the-
record discussions, information leaks and relatively new media talks (Alexander, Papers, 
1941-1945; British Movietone News, 1944a, 1944b; British Pathé, 1944; Burgoyne, 1942; 
Churchill, 1942; Curtin, 1942b, 1942c; ScreenSound Australia, 1944). First, a literature 
review is conducted to show gaps in the research on his political news interviews with press 
and broadcast reporters. Secondly, this paper outlines its multi-method approach to determine 
Curtin’s ability to persuade journalists and news audiences to support his prime ministership. 
A dramaturgy approach is applied to examine his development of symbolic messages and 
visual images to stage news media representations of him as a trusted leader (Castells, 2007, 
2008; Manning, 1996). Moreover, quantitative analyses are used to ascertain his broadcasting 
of accessible media messages that were reported favourably in the news. Thirdly, the finding 
is made that Curtin mainly persuaded parliamentary news reporters to visualise and define 
enemy deviance and threats to Australia that contributed to his electoral popularity. An 
analysis of his techniques facilitates journalism students’ understanding of the need to 
develop ways to counteract subtle political manipulations for opening democratic decision-
making more to public audiences. 
 
Literature review 
Whereas academic authors have written about Curtin’s extraordinary use of twice-
daily interviews, there is an absence of a comprehensive study of his news management 
techniques that would give us insights into his influence of journalists during a critical time 
(Coatney, 2009; Lloyd, 1998; Lloyd & Hall, 1997). Some authors have researched Australian 
wartime correspondents’ reminiscences (Coatney, 2012a; Wurth, 2006); however, these have 
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been largely overlooked by scholars, even though these oral histories have provided insights 
about how Curtin managed his media relations (Alexander, 1971; Bray, 1971; Chamberlain, 
1972-1973; Commins, 1971; Cox, 1973; Davidson, 1996; Douglas, 1972; Ewing, 1999; 
Fraser, 1972-1973; Holt, 1978; Reid, 1972-1973; Whitington, 1977). Biographical accounts 
help to explain his egalitarian approach as the prime minister, when he talked with the 
political reporters as his professional colleagues and displayed his Australian Journalists’ 
Association (AJA) badge on his coat each day. He had been the editor of The Timber Worker 
and The Westralian Worker; when the AJA district president in Perth, WA, he had helped to 
arrange Australia’s first university extension classes for journalists in 1919 (Black, 1995; 
Lloyd, 1985; Ross, 1977). Some researchers have commented on his expanded use of the 
prime ministerial press secretary role when he gave the position to his press adviser Don 
Rodgers, who had been a journalist colleague from the Labor Daily (Coatney, 2011; Hall, 
1998; Rodgers, 1971). With Rodgers’ assistance, Curtin was able to delegate censorship 
duties to bureaucrats and deflect the press criticisms about the suppression of information 
away from him (Hilvert, 1984). As a result, Curtin’s interviews appeared more open-ended, 
frequent and informative than those given by the former Australian leaders, as well as the 
news conferences held by Churchill, Roosevelt and Canada’s Mackenzie King (Coatney, 
2011; Lloyd, 1988).  
While a few scholars have written of Curtin’s interest in film and radio broadcasts, 
very few authors have investigated his visual techniques to stage-manage newsreel scenes 
(Coatney, 2012b; Day, 2000, Parliamentary Committee on Broadcasting, 1945-1946; Ward, 
1999). His attempts to appear as a natural media performer belied his three decades of intense 
study of oratory that encouraged him to broadcast prime ministerial talks similar to 
Roosevelt’s homespun “fireside chats” that began in 1933. During the same year, Roosevelt 
had appointed the first presidential press secretary, Stephen T. Early, to help mask his polio 
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disability from news audiences; almost 10 years later, Curtin received help from his media 
adviser, Rodgers, to persuade journalists to understate his health problems. Just as 
Roosevelt’s death shocked US audiences on April 12, 1945, many Australians were 
astonished to read the news that Curtin had died on July 5 of the same year, shortly before the 
Pacific war’s end (Coatney, 2012b; Day, 1999; Gallagher, 1996; O’Shaughnessy, 2003). This 
study ascertains how Curtin managed the relatively new media, including broadcast reporters, 
to secure the journalists’ voluntary cooperation to self-censor and articulate his elaborately 
constructed messages of visualising enemy deviance against Australian ideals (1941a, 1942a, 
1943a, 1944a). 
To assess Curtin’s news management techniques, this study has examined the 
established practices before his government. When they were prime ministers, neither Joseph 
Lyons nor Robert Menzies shared confidential information with the press gallery. As Clem 
Lloyd (1988) has discussed, Lyons preferred to visit Sir Keith Murdoch at his Melbourne 
Herald office to reveal urgent news; however, he lost the newspaper’s support because the 
press proprietor argued for a stronger military response to the growing European conflict. 
Bridget Griffen-Foley (2002), Lloyd (1988), A.W. Martin and Patsy Hardy (1993) have 
shown Menzies’ divisive relations with the Canberra press gallery that eventually led to the 
severing of his friendships with media owners including Murdoch. Furthermore, in his 1941 
diary, Menzies revealed that the relatively new “movie-camera” interviews were “the kind of 
thing I shy at very much” (cited in Martin & Hardy, 1993, p. 60). Although the newsreel 
company, Movietone, occasionally showed direct addresses of James Scullin, Lyons and 
Menzies, Curtin became the first prime minister to develop extensively the film medium as a 
form of political communication (British Movietone News, 1932, 1935, 1941a, 1941b, 1941c; 
National Film and Sound Archive, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c). According to David Day (1999, 
2000), Curtin had been a town hall speaker who was not comfortable with the need to 
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perform for the newsreels in 1937; yet he gradually developed a film persona as a humble, 
plain and hard-working man that resonated with wartime cinema audiences. While Lyons 
directed the ABC to appoint its first Canberra news correspondent in 1939 because of his 
arguments with Murdoch, Curtin recognised early the shift to radio by the middle of this 
decade (Crisp, 1978; Petersen, 1993; Ward, 1999). His predecessors made only limited use of 
press gallery interviews, radio and film and their media relations were often troublesome. 
This article contributes to an understanding of government-media relations by identifying 
Curtin’s use of news broadcasting and the press to communicate his main foreign policy 
goals to public audiences. 
 
Methodology 
This study has conducted a multi-method approach to discover Curtin’s news 
management techniques that persuaded journalists to visualise and define the war to 
Australian audiences. First, the impact of his media statements in his interviews will be 
ascertained by determining the extent to which journalists favourably reported his messages 
in their newspapers. A study has been made of the keywords in 11 of his major foreign policy 
statements and speeches, particularly his emphases of inclusive language, such as “we”, “us”, 
“our” and “the people”; ideals about “freedom”, “liberty”, “democracy” and “independence”; 
as well as his emphases of threats by the use of war terms about the enemy (Curtin, 1941a, 
1941b, 1942a, 1942d, 1942e, 1942f, 1943a, 1943b, 1943c, 1944a, 1944b). This analysis aims 
to show the extent to which journalists selected, amplified and reproduced his language for 
news readers. For this purpose, this article considers how journalists portrayed his news 
media messages in the next day’s issues of four city broadsheet dailies – The Age, The 
Canberra Times, The Sydney Morning Herald and The West Australian (1941-1945). This 
analysis is based on the Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism formula 
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(2008) that a news article is deemed “positive” if two-thirds of the statements appear to 
support a leader (Public Broadcasting Service, 2009). These quantitative and qualitative 
analyses assist in gleaning an understanding of Curtin’s persuasive abilities to influence the 
news coverage of his media interviews. 
Secondly, other historical news archives reveal how Curtin stage-managed and 
structured his media conferences to appear as two-way discussions with reporters (Alexander, 
1971; Cox, 1973; Reid, 1972-1973). Applying a news making approach of journalism as a 
product of “institutional demands and processes”, this chapter will investigate the day-to-day 
media routines that provided opportunities for Curtin to generate favourable news about his 
foreign policies (Tiffen, 1989, p. 3). He encouraged the journalists to think of themselves as 
part of a “knowledge class”, who were undertaking a key role in constituting government 
visions of order, stability and change that helped manage Australian society in war (Ericson, 
Baranek & Chan, 1987, pp. 1, 16; Frow, 1995, pp. 119-30). This analytical approach helps to 
glean a deeper understanding of how Curtin elicited journalists’ cooperation to portray his 
leadership positively in the news media. 
Thirdly, this article uses a dramaturgy approach to explore the more theatrical aspects 
of Curtin’s techniques to create a media image of him as a trustworthy leader for newsreel 
audiences. Politics can be staged for the media to create symbolic messages of trust about a 
leader so as to obtain citizens’ support, as Manuel Castells has shown (2007; 2008). This 
study undertakes an innovative examination of Curtin’s filmed rehearsals and unissued 
newsreels, as well as screened appearances (British Movietone News, 1942, 1944a, 1944b, 
1944c; British Pathé, 1944; Cinesound Productions, 1941, 1941-1945; Cinesound Review, 
1943; Cinesound Review & Movietone News, 1943; ScreenSound Australia, 1944). The 
practice sessions indicate the importance that he placed on delivering forceful rhetoric and 
strong gestures (ScreenSound Australia, 1944). An analysis will be made of the camera 
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angles, shots and signs, or meaning, based on Arthur Asa Berger’s semiotic film conventions 
(1982), to show how he collaborated with filmmakers to portray the semblance of a close 
relationship with news audiences.  
Fourthly, this article examines the accessibility of Curtin’s radio broadcasts to 
understand better his aim to involve journalists in cooperating with him to articulate 
“society’s proper bounds of behaviour” (Curtin, 1941a, 1942a, 1943a, 1944a; Ericson, 
Baranek & Chan, 1987, 1). With this aim, the article uses a readability measurement, the 
Flesch-Kincaid score. The recommended score for most public documents is about eight, 
close to the reading level of “middle-brow” newspapers and suitable for an eighth-grade 
student (Day, 2008; Lim, 2003). Although he cultivated media messages as a self-assured 
speaker, this formula measures his ability to prepare talks that would be easily reproducible 
in the next day’s newspapers and engage wartime Australians, whose average education level 
was nine years of schooling (Carver, 1942; Kelley & Evans, 1996). 
 
Findings and discussion 
Extending media conferences 
Following the concepts of journalism as a part of governance, this study has found 
that Curtin carefully arranged his off-the-record press talks to appear as egalitarian, two-way 
exchanges of information that persuaded correspondents to support him (Alexander, 1971; 
Cox, 1973; Ericson, Baranek & Chan, 1987). As Foucault has described (1991, p. 102), 
leaders have used calculations, tactics and news media technologies to allow for a “very 
specific albeit complex form of power”. Although Curtin benefited from censorship, he 
appeared to lean backwards nonchalantly on his swivel chair at the desk in his blue, 
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upholstered prime minister’s office, as if he were “thinking out loud” at his twice-daily 
interviews (Clearing the atmosphere, February 10, 1945; Whitington, 1977, p. 77). While he 
appeared to be a friend to some 10 senior political journalists at the conferences, he and press 
secretary Rodgers worked to create a collegial atmosphere (Rodgers, 1971; Whitington, 
1977). Before he became the prime minister, he had initially appeared abrupt and unfriendly 
to the conservative Bulletin cartoonist, John Frith (1994), who had felt “possibly less than the 
dirt on the sole of his shoe” at their first meeting. He had also seemed tired to the Sun News-
Pictorial federal correspondent Harold Cox (1973), who would talk with him for lengthy 
periods as he had chain-smoked, reclining on an uninviting couch of wood and hard cushions 
in the opposition leader’s room. Once the prime minister, however, he encouraged journalists 
to see themselves as Curtin’s travelling “circus”, who shared his confidence to an extent 
previously unknown in Australian press history (Alexander, 1971, Whitington, 1977). The 
journalists viewed their roles with a larger degree of liberation and spontaneity since the 
formalised press associations of previous prime ministers’ relations (Alexander, 1971; 
Chamberlain, 1972-1973; Commins, 1971; Cox, 1973; Davidson, 1996; Douglas, 1972; 
Ewing, 1999; Fraser, 1972-1973; Holt, 1978; Reid, 1972-1973; Whitington, 1977). Yet they 
were acting as Curtin’s “control agents” as he selected publishable information and permitted 
them to write confidential notes for their news organisations’ proprietors (Alexander, Papers, 
1941, November 25-December 8; Ericson, Baranek & Chan, 1987, p. 356).  
By the time of the first enemy bombing of the Australian mainland, the journalists 
were already cooperating with Curtin’s interviews as his “knowledge linkers”, explaining and 
interpreting matters of governance to news audiences (Ericson, Baranek & Chan, 1987, p. 
16). As The Herald Canberra wartime bureau head, Joseph Alexander, explained (1971), the 
interviews were “a two-way pipeline of information” between Curtin and the reporters. 
Shortly after Japan’s military government bombed Darwin on February 19, 1942, the 
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correspondents began their unwritten agreement to understate the news of his health problems 
for the rest of his life. Although he was diagnosed with gastritis at St Vincent’s Hospital in 
Sydney during the attacks, reporters emphasised that the problem was the result of prolonged 
tension due to the heavy burdens of his wartime prime ministership. He had begun feeling 
internal pain two days earlier during his prepared, broadcast speech in Martin Place, but a 
newsreel reporter did not remark on his struggle at the time (British Movietone News, 1942; 
Curtin ill, 1942, February 18; Mr. Curtin in hospital, 1942, February 18). Some 45 minutes 
after his filmed talk, he was taken to the hospital and his daughter, “Young Elsie”, was his 
only visitor for the rest of the day (Curtin ill, 1942, February 18; Prime minister in hospital 
…, 1942, February 19; Rodgers, 1971). Instead, film narrator Leslie Mitchell told 
moviegoers: “As we know, he is not in the habit of beating about the bush and his impromptu 
remarks on this occasion were typically frank.” By referring to Curtin’s “impromptu 
remarks” and the cheering spectators, including city office workers and Pacific islanders, the 
correspondents created the appearance of a spontaneous news report, disingenuously 
conveying him to be a natural speaker (Australia, arise, 1942, February 18, p. 8; British 
Movietone News, 1942; Liberty loan, 1942, February 18). Their attitudes resembled the 
consensus of most US media to portray Roosevelt’s activist presidency and stop reporting on 
his polio disability, turning their cameras away from his leg braces and wheelchair 
(Gallagher, 1996; O’Shaughnessy, 2003). Since Curtin worked closely with the Canberra 
press, the reporters noticed when his face turned paler and his voice became 
uncharacteristically irritable at his twice-daily interviews (Cox, Typescript reports, August 
21, October 19, 1944, January 22, February 9, March 5, 19, April 9, 1945). They withheld 
their observations from the public because they did not want to jeopardise their privileged 
access to information. In contrast, Churchill and Roosevelt were more easily able to hide their 
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times of illness due to their more distant media relations (Moss, 2005; Roosevelt, 1944; Tait, 
2008). 
From his hospital bed, Curtin released a prepared statement on the Darwin attacks that 
was read to the Federal Parliament on 19 February (1942d). Newspaper publishers directly 
quoted many of his messages to underplay the brief reports about his health; they also 
emphasised that Allied forces had destroyed four enemy planes to signify a patriotic 
achievement and censored Australian fatalities (Darwin bombed, 1942, February 20; Heavy 
Japanese blows on Darwin, 1942, February 20; Two air raids on Darwin, 1942, February 20; 
Two big air raids on Darwin, 1942, February 20). Despite Curtin mentioning the “enemy” 
only once in his statement (1942d), the next day’s related Canberra Times reports included 
this term 18 times (Australia can take it, 1942, February 20; Heavy Japanese blows on 
Darwin, 1942, February 20). Neither Curtin nor the Australian reporters referred to the ideals 
of freedom, liberty and democracy, which had been prevalent in the prime minister’s earlier 
speeches (Cinesound Productions, 1941-1945; Curtin, 1941a). Yet his appeal to “the gallantry 
that is traditional in the people of our stock” was repeated in the next day’s reports (1942d, p. 
9). In fact, The Age leader writer announced: “The Government of this country is entitled to 
the pre-knowledge that the Australian people are prepared to trust its considered judgment, 
and to accept whatever conclusion it may reach” (War comes home to Australia, 1942, 
February 20, p. 2). The newspaper publishers reaffirmed their support for Curtin’s leadership 
by stating: Australians would “trust” the government’s “considered judgment”; heed his call 
for “total mobilisation” to be “in the forefront of the fight”; and give “solid backing” for his 
strategies to place the nation “on a war footing” (Australia can take it, 1942, February 20, p. 
4; Darwin bombed, 1942, February 20, p. 5; War comes home to Australia, 1942, February 
20, p. 2). By accentuating Curtin’s language of the enemy, the journalists cooperated with 
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him in hyperbole to visualise the city’s bombing as “Australia’s greatest hour” (Into the front 
line, 1942, February 20, p. 4).  
 
Negotiating information leaks 
While Curtin confidentially talked with journalists about his attempts to strengthen 
Australian defence, he expected the reporters would leak some of these messages about 
national peril. He used his professional journalism background to focus on negative news, an 
“inevitable focus” of democratic society that allowed national leaders to campaign for “more 
correction, repair, alteration, improvement, and resources” (Ericson, Baranek & Chan, 1987, 
p. 350). After the Darwin bombing, he showed “a great pile” of secret cables to the 
journalists. With this dramatic tactic, he told them that he had defied Churchill’s orders to 
send some Australian Imperial Force (AIF) troops from the Middle East to Burma 
(Alexander, 1971; Churchill, 1942; Curtin, 1942c). The journalists agreed to uphold his 
media embargo during his decision to redirect these troops, the AIF Sixth and Seventh 
Divisions, to Australia. He advised the correspondents that the divisions were making their 
ocean voyage, without the protection of air cover, to aid national defence (Commins, 1971; 
Cox, 1973; Whitington, 1977). As the Herald’s Joseph Alexander recounted, “although we 
were staggered at the idea of Curtin opposing the will of a man like Churchill at a time like 
this, we all felt, I think, proud of him, because he was determined to put Australia first” 
(1971). Whereas the journalists agreed to censor the news, they cooperated with Curtin to 
portray his defence priorities and hinted at his dispute with Churchill (Commoners want 
empire cabinet, 1942, January 9; Conduct of the war, 1942, January 10; England, 1942, 
March 23; Ministry takes responsibility, 1942, January 10). For example, The Canberra 
Times editor published Dame Mary Gilmore’s poem that depicted Curtin as calmly looking at 
the sky and sea to watch over “Australia’s sons”, the “Anzac” men, likening him to the 
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“great” Abraham Lincoln (1942, p. 1). Through theatrical gesturing, confidential briefings 
and an official news embargo, he secured journalists’ cooperation for his campaign on 
national defence. 
Soon afterwards, Curtin developed informal media interactions to show his genuine 
concern for the troops’ safety, eliciting reporters’ support for his risky military strategy. He 
talked with The Sun bureau chief, Alan Reid, in a train lobby about his nightmares that the 
troops’ ships might be torpedoed. Reid recalled he “tried to comfort” Curtin by playing a card 
game of bridge in the train, but “periodically you’d see him wipe the sweat from his 
forehead” (1972-1973). One late summer evening in King’s Hall, Parliament House, Curtin 
saw The Sun News-Pictorial’s Harold Cox, paused and exclaimed: “Harold! What would you 
do if you knew their [the troops’] equipment was on another convoy two days behind them?” 
The next evening, he met Cox by coincidence again. The journalist remarked to Curtin that 
he looked “a lot better”. Curtin replied: “Yes, I feel a lot better, too. They’re coming home” 
(Cox, 1973). The divisions landed safely in his Fremantle electorate in WA in early March 
1942. Although there was not an official welcome ceremony, Curtin had already authorised 
the information leak to journalists about the troops’ arrival, tacitly encouraging more 
Australians to tell the story of how he had made a stand for the nation (Burgoyne, 1942; 
Rodgers, 1971). Due to his off-the-record talks and information leak, he had taken 
precautions to ensure he would not appear responsible for releasing top-secret messages that 
benefited him politically.  
With the occasional strictures of censorship, Curtin’s long-time friend and Perth’s 
Daily News editor Geoff Burgoyne was pressuring him to remove the media embargo. 
Burgoyne wrote to Curtin that he was “boiling over” the censorship because the local harbour 
was full of transports and escorts while soldiers and sailors were crowding the streets, 
looking for “a square meal”. He added the “Brass Hats” censors were “the last word in 
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stupidity, time wasters and makers of unnecessary work” (Burgoyne, 1942). Three weeks 
later, Curtin replied that he had removed the ban on the same day that Burgoyne had written 
the letter, implying the news editor’s protest had influenced his decision. He explained the 
government had required media secrecy to protect the troops’ safety and avoid alerting 
distant enemies (Curtin, 1942b). Through this direct communication, Curtin maintained his 
professional relationship with Burgoyne while diverting the media to target other government 
officials with their censorship protests.  
 Press secretary Don Rodgers was promoting the story of Curtin “bringing the troops 
home” through the manufacturing of news involving “multiple and lengthy production lines” 
(Ericson, Baranek & Chan, 1987, p. 350; Mickler, 1996, 1998, p. 14). Rodgers repeated the 
anecdote that Curtin “couldn’t sleep while the boys were still on the water” to ensure the 
story appeared in the press during the 1943 election campaign (1971; Commins, 1971; Mr 
Coles’s stand, 1943, July 23; Why he supported ... 1943, July 23). Once the story was well-
known, Curtin took credit for the AIF troops’ return, saying it saved Australia “in the nick of 
time” from “going down the drain to the depths of misery and suffering” (Curtin, 1943d, pp. 
39, 45). Rodgers (1971) recalled this public relations campaign “was a very smart move” that 
contributed to the ALP achieving its greatest election victory at the time, with Curtin winning 
66.9 per cent of the votes for his Fremantle seat. Whereas Murdoch and Sir Frank Packer 
published critical editorials, other news groups supported the government including Warwick 
Fairfax’s The Sydney Morning Herald, the Australian Broadcasting Commission (ABC) and 
press gallery journalists (Alexander, Papers, 1943, 20 August; Dixon to Controller Of Public 
Relations, 1943; Holt, 1978; Moses, 1982; Whitington, 1977). Murdoch argued that 
Australians should have helped to defend Burma; however, his views did not resonate with 
federal electorates because of the Allies’ decisive defeat in the country the previous year 
(1943a, 1943b). Working for Murdoch’s Herald, Joseph Alexander remembered that the 
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“hostile” editorials “made a painful impression on me, because the country was at war and in 
grave danger, and certainly there was no one else who could conceivably be considered as 
taking Curtin’s place” (1971). Furthermore, Alexander noticed “considerable dissatisfaction 
among senior men in the office with KM’s [Keith Murdoch’s] policy” and his “intentionally 
personal” editorials. He added, “[t]hey say the paper has made enemies everywhere” 
(Alexander, Papers, 1943, August 21). Other newspaper groups and the ABC were reporting 
on “the rhetorics, personalities, methods and press releases” of the elected establishment 
(Alexander, Papers, 1943, 20 August; Dixon to Controller Of Public Relations, 1943; 
Hartley, 1996, p. 241; Moses, 1982). By magnifying positive stories about his leadership, 
Curtin bolstered his stature with journalists through his government office’s communications 
that distanced his administration from personal attacks in the Murdoch press. 
 
Expanding relatively new media talks 
Wartime filmmakers also cooperated with Curtin in a variety of newsreels to show 
him in close-up, eye-level images that portrayed him as an honest, hard-working leader, who 
often looked directly into the camera to appear on equal terms with his Australian news 
audiences. He rehearsed his words and hand gestures during multiple directors’ takes 
(Cinesound Productions, 1941; Cinesound Review, 1943; ScreenSound Australia, 1944). For 
example, cinema audiences watched a staged scene, intended to appear as an impromptu 
media conference, when Curtin spoke his prepared words, “the truth is if we do not strip 
ourselves to save for our country, the enemy will do it for us with ruthless efficiency, 
imposing upon us a maximum of misery” (Cinesound Review & Movietone News, 1943). 
The filmmakers created the appearance of a factual news report as they showed eye-level 
images of him, seated at a table, to speak to an assumed group of people, who were not 
pictured in the scene (ScreenSound Australia, 1944). Contrasting with Lyons and Menzies, 
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who were filmed standing at news interviews to indicate ascendency over the reporters, 
Curtin used more inclusive messages to suggest a direct, personal relationship between him 
and news audiences (British Movietone News, 1932, 1935, 1941a, 1941b, 1941c, 1942, 
1944a; British Pathé 1944). 
The newsreel off-cuts revealed more insights into Curtin’s unguarded interactions 
with international leaders and journalists. Unedited footage showed his tense relations with 
Churchill, when the commonwealth prime ministers posed for a series of official group 
photographs in the garden of 10 Downing Street, London in May 1944. During a brief break 
in the photo shoot, the other politicians comfortably talked with one another as Curtin and 
Churchill, seated together in the centre front row, looked silently ahead. When the 
photographer signalled he had finished, Churchill quickly strode away without saying a word 
to Curtin and seemed to be scowling as in deep thought. Curtin lit British Foreign Secretary 
Anthony Eden’s cigarette and they smoked together (British Movietone News, 1944b). For 
the edited, screened version, the narrator described the “pleasant peaceful Maytime setting” 
in the garden and then cut to another meeting that showed Churchill cheerfully lighting his 
cigar and a smiling Curtin (British Movietone News, 1944c). The filmmakers acted as 
“cultural workmen” to recreate scenes that were subject to “immense diffusion and 
consumption” by news audiences (Ericson, Baranek & Chan, 1987, p. 356; Foucault, 1980, p. 
131). Other unedited scenes showed Curtin’s enthusiastic exchanges with reporters as he 
arrived at the Croydon aerodrome for the London meeting. He appeared relaxed, with his 
hands in his herringbone overcoat pockets, as he interacted with the photographers, film 
crews and radio and newspaper journalists (British Movietone News, 1944a). As Foucault has 
stated (1975, pp. 25, 27), “it was necessary for power to be self-effacing, for it not to show 
itself as power”. Since Curtin had already developed positive relations with the reporters, he 
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persuaded them to conceal frictions with some Allied leaders, thus accomplishing the 
Foucauldian task of masking national power.  
Similarly, Curtin expanded the prime minister’s use of radio to develop the semblance 
of a close relationship between him and listeners. His initiatives included broadcasting 
Australia’s first independent declaration of war (1941a); giving the first speech directly from 
Canberra to US listeners (1942a; Publicity, 1941, October 31); and making the prime 
minister’s election campaign address through a radio hook-up from Canberra (1943a; Black, 
1995). As he targeted his words for working-class audiences, this study found his radio 
speeches were generally for a tenth-grade reading level that was appropriate for Australia’s 
average education attainment at the time (1941a, 1942a, 1943a, 1944a). While Menzies’ radio 
announcement of the war against Germany was suited to a twelfth-grade audience (1939), 
Curtin’s declaration of war against Japan was targeted to the ninth-grade level, close to the 
ideal score (1941a; Day, 2008; Lim, 2003). Moreover, Curtin communicated more frequently 
to radio listeners than did US President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who was recognised for his 
advanced use of the relatively new media. Curtin made about 12 significant prime ministerial 
radio addresses each year. In contrast, Roosevelt gave about nine radio talks each year during 
his presidential terms (A lesson … 1942, March 20; Coatney, 2011). News owners kept 
reporting on Curtin’s broadcasts, as well as publishing editorials that encouraged citizen 
discussions about his statements (e.g. Editorial … 1943, August 23; Now comes the fight, 
1942, March 18; War and peace … 1943, July 27). While he referred to keywords of freedom 
and “total liberty”, the press was more likely to magnify his rhetoric of a “grave menace” and 
the enemy (Curtin, 1941a, 1942a, 1942d, 1942e, 1942f, 1944a; The Age, The Canberra 
Times, The Sydney Morning Herald, The West Australian, December 9, 29-30, 1941, 
February 20, March 16, May 9, December 11, 1942, February 12, 1943, May 9, 1944). As he 
was increasingly absent from the parliament due to his health problems, The Age editorial 
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writer acknowledged Australian listeners needed to “hear his voice, weigh his words and 
generally maintain that personal contact with the head of the Government which is eminently 
desirable” (The steersman … 1945, 22 January). The frequency of his broadcasts, the largely 
favourable reception towards these in the selected newspapers, the mass audiences of regular 
wartime listeners and polls suggested he used radio skilfully to persuade journalists to 
amplify his rhetoric on enemy deviance (Curtin and poll, 1943, August 23; Mr. Curtin’s job 
… 1942, August 14; The Age, The Canberra Times, The Sydney Morning Herald, The West 
Australian, December 9, 29-30, 1941, February 20, March 16, May 9, December 11, 1942, 
February 12, July 27, December 15, 1943, May 9, July 19, 1944; January 23, July 5-6, 1945).  
 
Conclusion 
This analysis of Curtin’s news management techniques shows how journalism became 
a part of his government that sustained an overriding, political perception in the media 
coverage about his leadership. After Curtin’s faltering media relations before his prime 
ministership, he came to view journalists as crucial in his governance as he used tactics, 
calculations and technologies to communicate his foreign policy objectives to public 
audiences. Due to his professional background in news making processes, he played a critical 
role in constructing the reports about him, directing the journalists’ intense focus on negative 
stories towards messages of foreign enemies. While he and press secretary Rodgers treated 
journalists as a “knowledge class”, they carefully structured interviews to appear as 
unguarded exchanges of information; behind the scenes, they selectively cultivated media 
messages that would generate favourable news reports about Curtin’s role in Australia’s 
military involvement in the Pacific war. As he benefited from censorship, he appeared to 
share astonishingly indiscreet information that helped him politically. With his knowledge of 
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news routines, he elicited Canberra journalists’ cooperation to “visualise” and “define” the 
threat to the nation, principally Axis aggression, as a social deviation from moral and ethical 
principles of fairness, justice and decency. Although the reporters purported to use depictive, 
realism grammar, their emphases of Curtin’s rhetoric of foreign enemies helped to shape 
public perceptions of “deviations” in the world, overlooking his tensions with Churchill, 
controversial military decisions and personal struggles (Ericson, Baranek & Chan, 1987; 
Foucault, 1975; Frow, 1995; Tiffen, 1989). 
By the wartime era, the modern media contained the visual, audio and press elements 
that allowed Curtin to communicate adeptly to mass audiences. Through developing the 
prime minister’s use of dramatic gesturing, inclusive language and close-up, eye-level camera 
techniques, he attempted to create a strong, forceful media image as well as the sense of a 
personal connection between him and news audiences. Since the broadcast reporters were a 
part of the government system, they deferred to Curtin’s constructed media representation of 
his leadership. As they articulated his views, the news audiences perceived the war through a 
selective government lens. Filmmakers cooperated to mask Curtin’s foreign policy challenges 
and articulate his views to assist with the shaping of public knowledge. With the journalists 
actively participating in Curtin’s manufacturing of news making, the wartime news did not 
fulfil professional ideals of mirroring reality. The relations of power and consensus between 
his government and journalists serve to show the value for students to delve beyond a 
deferential style of reporting on political leaders, however seemingly friendly or effusive 
(Berger, 1982; Castells, 2007, 2008; Foucault, 1980, 1988, 1991; National Film and Sound 
Archive, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c). 
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